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Abstract 
This paper responds to the criticism of the Zubair Diminishing Balance model for Islamic home financing 
that Ahmad Kameel Meera published in the ISRA Journal. The response argues that most of the 
comments of the Meera are frivolous and misplaced. It reiterates that the ZDBM is much different from 
other models; it is cheaper for the customer without being costlier to the bank. more efficient in resource 
allocation and improves liquidity in the financial system. However, the mathematical appendix is a 
positive contribution of the paper. 
 
Key words: Islamic home financing, conventional model; BBA; MMP; ZDBM; Segmental murabahah 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ahmad Kameel Meera has published an article in the current issue of ISRA Journal (2012) 
which “criticizes a new Islamic home financing model” based on diminishing balance as 
proposed in Hasan (2011) and named the ZDBM. For brevity, I shall refer to Meera’s work as 
the Critique. The main points of criticism it contains are as follows (P.7).  
 
1. ZDBM is similar to the conventional interest based loan, or at best, similar to the 
murabahah-based bay bi thaman ajil (BBA). 
2. It is not cheaper to the customer. On the contrary, it is potentially more burdensome to 
him, particularly when it comes to early settlement. 
3. Musharakah mutanaqisa program for home financing or the MMP is superior to the 
ZDBM and is recognized as fully Shari’ah compliant.  
 
I shall deal with these observations in that order and show how the demonstrations in the 
Critique are at variance with the perceptions of its author. 
 
II. NON-SIMILARITY WITH OTHER MODELS 
 
 
All home financing models would have, as they do, some similar requirements. For example, the 
need for pricing, installment fixation, loan repayment and the like are common to them all. 
Similarities, however, need not make their substance also the same. For differences the models 
must be compared on the logic of their structuring and on the basis of legal observance and 
                                                          
1 The views expressed are of the author and need in no way be associated with INCEIF the Global University of 
Islamic finance where he currently works. Since the ISRA Journal does not accept as a policy comments on the 
material it publishes; this response is put on the internet as a short working paper. 
2. Meera shows how this could happen in the case of BBA on P. 12 but he does not show why and how this would 
happen in the ZDBM.  
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social efficacy of their consequences. One such similarity Meera indicates between the BBA and 
ZDBM. He says “ ZDBM would face problems similar to those encountered in BBA financing 
particularly when it comes to early settlement, the balance of financing can even be more than 
the original financing amount (P.7)”2 Presumably, problems of the sort could arise if the 
murabahah is initially contracted on the full value of the deferred payment as in BBA. However, 
in the ZDBM murabahah is segmental; it applies to individual installments, not to their 
collectivity.  That is why ZDBM is a sort of financial innovation. It has no similarity with BBA.  
        Interestingly, the issue of similarities the Critique highlights has caused some serious 
inconsistencies in the formulation of its own arguments.  Its Tables supply ample material to help 
fillip the proposition in the reverse direction. Table 1 below is drawn using data from Tables 1, 2 
and 3 of the Critique. We use the column identification as given in the first two of these tables. 
Columns B, C, D and E in Section 1 correspond to B1, C1, D1 and E1 column for column in 
Section 2 of the Table.      
        The scrutiny as to why the details of the three models – conventional BBA and the MMP – 
in Section 1 are identical (not similar) and why those for the ZDBM in Section 2 are so different 
from them would help clarify many misconceptions the Critique contains. The departures signify 
qualitative differences supportive of the Diminishing Balance Model.  
        To Meera, the ZDBM looks cheaper because earlier installment payments are larger 
compared to those in the MMP. He then goes on to show (PP.17-19 Tables 5 and 6) as to how 
the variations in installment amount would affect the return on capital. But mathematics devoid 
of logic cannot create an srgument albeit it can help build or destroy its reasoning.. Amortization 
in the ZDBM at a uniform rate derives its justification from the Islamic norms of equity and fair 
play; it is not arbitrarily fixed.  
  
Tab1e 1. ZDBM is different from other models which have identical structures and results 
                                SECTION 1                                                                     SECTION 2         
  
                   Data source: Meera’s Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
                                       ZDBM
Installment Return of Diminishing 4% Mark- Installment Return of Diminishing 4% Mark- Installment
Capital Balance up on C payments Capital Balance up on C1 Payments
A B C D E = B + D B1 C1 D1 E1 = B1 + D1
0 0 80,000 0 80,000
1 2686.54 76313.46 3200.01 5886.54 4000 76,000 3200 7200
2 2794.01 74519.46 3092.54 5886.54 4000 72,000 3040 7040
3 2905.76 76613.71 2980.78 5886.54 4000 68,000 2880 6880
4 3021.99 68591.71 2864.55 5886.54 4000 64,000 2720 6720
5 3142.87 65448.83 2743.67 5886.54 4000 60,000 2560 6560
6 3268.59 62180.25 2617.95 5886.54 4000 56,000 2400 6400
7 3399.33 58780.92 2487.21 5886.54 4000 52,000 2240 6240
8 3535.31 55245.61 2351.24 5886.54 4000 48,000 2080 6080
9 3676.72 51568.91 2209.82 5886.54 4000 44,000 1920 5920
10 3823.78 47745.11 2062.76 5886.54 4000 40,000 1760 5760
11 3976.74 43768.38 1909.81 5886.54 4000 36,000 1600 5600
12 4135.81 39632.57 1750.74 5886.54 4000 32,000 1440 5440
13 4301.24 35331.34 1585.31 5886.54 4000 28,000 1280 5280
14 4473.29 30858.05 1413.25 5886.54 4000 24,000 1120 5120
15 4652.22 26205.83 1234.32 5886.54 4000 20,000 960 4960
16 4838.31 21367.52 1048.23 5886.54 4000 16,000 800 4800
17 5031.84 16335.69 854.71 5886.54 4000 12,000 640 4640
18 5233.11 11102.57 653.43 5886.54 4000 8,000 480 4480
19 5442.44 5660.14 444.11 5886.54 4000 4,000 320 4320
20 5660.13 0 226.41 5886.54 4000 0 160 4160
Total 80,000 947,270 37730.85 117730.8 80000 840,000 33600 113600
MODELS: Conventional, BBA and MMP
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        It may well be noted that researches have confirmed the uniform amortization payments as 
the best from the viewpoint of ownership transfer to the customer (Chambers et al 2007). One 
disputing the claim has to  show that any departure from uniformity in return of capital amounts 
could give logically better results on the touchstone of justice to the customer..    
        Finally, the claim that ZDBM is cheaper for the customer is confirmed by footnotes to 
tables 2 and 4 of the Critique. For both the conventional and MMP the average annual return for 
the bank is 4.72% while it is 4.20% in the case of ZDBM. But the IRR in either case remains the 
same at 8%. The reason is that the sum of funding deposits -- the outstanding balances -- is 
proportionately reduced in the ZDBM. Hasan (2012) provides the proof summarized as under.   
 
 
 
       Thus, the ZDBM is not only cheaper it is also more efficient than the MMP: it absorbs fewer 
resources and to that extent improves liquidity in the financial system. In this context, Meera 
raises two interesting questions. First, the IRR in all models being the same 8% why the bank 
would not be indifferent to a choice between them? A more relevant question I think would be 
why would the bank not be attracted to the ZDBM to please the customers with lower payments 
without incurring any additional costs in the shape of lower rate of return; would it not give 
Islamic banks a competitive edge over their conventional rivals?  
       The second question of Meera is: from where Hasan got the 8% rental rate for the ZDBM 
and how? The question looks frivolous in the present context. Using the same rate, whatever be 
the percentage, is a methodological tool in model comparisons not an operational reality. In their 
illustration La-riba also fixes the rate at 8% a year. This helped me discover that they too are 
using the Excel formula. Meera himself uses 8% for all models in his Critique for comparing 
results. 
 
III. EXCEL FORMULA AND COMPOUNDING: IMPACT ON MMP 
 
Meera (2012 and with Razak 2009) concedes that the results in the MMP and conventional 
model would be identical if the rate of interest and the rental rate were identical but he does not 
explain why? The reason is not that the rates used are identical. The reason is that both models 
use the same Microsoft Excel amortization formula for the determination of the periodic 
installment payments. This formula is given below   
 
  
Here,  
A = Installment amount the customer has to pay per time unit to the bank 
P0 = Bank’s contribution (loan) to the purchase price of the house  
r = the rate of interest payable on outstanding loan per period  
n = number of time units the payment period is divided; be it a week, a month or a year. 
A = Installment amount the customer has to pay per time unit to the bank 
891.0
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P0 = Bank’s contribution (loan) to the purchase price of the house  
r = the rate of interest payable on outstanding loan per period  
I have shown in a recent paper that this formula involves compounding of interest (Hasan 2012). 
It adds the current period interest to the preceding period balance for calculating the current 
period balance. The simplified formula for determining the current period outstanding balance 
(Pn) is derived to be as under. 
 
Pn = Pn-1 (1 + r)
n
 – A                                            (2) 
 
Based on this formula the compounding process is explained by the following simple Figure 1 
based on data in Table 1 above.      
 
 A further un-Islamic consequence of using this formula additional to compounding is that until 
the successful completion of the contract the rate of ownership transfer to the customer remains 
lower that the rate of payment made. In the ZDBM the two stay identical all through. Table 2 and 
Figure 2 provide the evidence on the point.  
 
Table 2: Home ownership transfer to the customer in conventional and MMP finance 
Semi-annual units 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Payment rate % 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Ownership rate % 3.35 6.85 10.48 14.36 18.19 22.27 26.52 30.94 35.54 40.32 45.29 50.46 55.83 61.42 67.24 73.29 76.56 86.12 92.92 100 
 
The construction of Table 2 is done as follows. The installment payments are uniform in all 
models except the ZDBM. So the payment rate increases by the reciprocal of total number of 
time units involved. Thus, in the three fixed payment models – conventional, BBA and the MMP 
– in our illustration, the incremental rate is 1/20 or 5%. On the other hand, ownership of the  
 
 
Installment # 0 1 2 18 19 20
Return on capital  plus 3200 3092.54 653.43 444.16 226.41
Diminishing Balance 80,000 77313.5 74519.5 11102.6 5660.14 0
Installment Minus 5886.54 5886.54 5886.54 5886.54 5886.54
Figure 1: Compounding infests all home financing models - Conventional, BBA ANa d the MMP
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Figure 2: Conventional MMP home financing transfers ownership to  
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house passes to the customer at a rate determined as follows: Divide the outstanding balance in 
column C each time by the total loan amount. Deduct the fraction so obtained from 1 and convert 
the result to a percentage. In the present case, we divided for example each value in column C 
Section 1 by 8oooo, deducted the fraction obtained from 1 and multiplied the result by 100. In 
contrast, in the ZDBM return of capital – not the payment - is uniform so the two rates are 
identical making the model equitable. 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It comes about that on the Islamic requirements of avoiding interest, more so the compounding, 
and for the observance of justice - to each his due without delay - the MMP using the Excel 
formula like the current practice is non-compliant and must be replaced with a better alternative 
like the ZDBM. The readers may refer to Hasan (2012) for detailed comparison of the two 
models. Finally, I must express my appreciation for Meera’s valuable contribution and especially 
for the Appendix in his paper that neatly presents mathematical formalization of concepts in the 
ZDBM. 
 
REFERENCES 
American Finance House – LARIBA: Financing alternative to the conventional, Riba System, Lariba.com 
Home Financing – Accessed on 24.10.2011  
Chambers, M. S, Garage, C and Sehlagehauf, D (September 2007): Mortgage contracts and housing 
tenure decisions, Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Research Division), pp. 1-40.  
Hasan, Zubair (2012): Islamic norms, Excel formula and Islamic home financing models, working paper, 
MPRA # 4835 ‘Zubair Hasan at IDEAS. 
Hasan Zubair (2011): Islamic home finance in the social mirror, ISRA: International Journal of Islamic 
Finance, Vol. 3, No.1 June.  
Meera, A. K. M & Razak, D. A (2009): Home financing through the MusharakahMutanaqisah contracts: 
some practical issues, JKAU: Islamic Economics, Vol. 22, No.1, pp. 3-25.  
Meera, A.K (2012): A critique of diminishing balance method of Islamic home financing, ISRA 
International Journal of Islamic Finance, Vol. 4 Issue 2 December.  
